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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the lead up to the 2008 Presidential election, there was broad 
bipartisan support for closing the detention facility at Guantanamo 
Bay.  President Bush was quoted as saying, “I’d like it to be over 
with.”1  John McCain and General Colin Powell echoed similar sen-
timents for ending detention at the naval base.2  In addition to prom-
  
    * Professor of Law and Director, Social Justice Institute, University of New 
Hampshire School of Law.  This article is dedicated to my husband, Cory Smith, 
whose commitment to protecting civil rights, civil liberties, and human rights 
through dogged advocacy and practice inspires and renews me. 
 1. Jane Mayer, The Trial, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, at 58 (discussing U.S. 
Attorney General Eric Holder’s role in implementing President Obama’s executive 
orders to suspend military commissions at Guantanamo Bay and the President’s 
timeline for closing the naval base). 
 2. Id. 
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inent Republicans calling for closure, public opinion began to sup-
port finding alternative solutions for prisoners held at Guantanamo 
Bay.3 
Barack Obama wasted no time once sworn into office executing 
his central campaign promises.  On January 22, 2009, two days after 
becoming the forty-fourth President of the United States,4 Obama 
signed three executive orders in the presence of sixteen retired ad-
mirals and generals in the Oval Office.5  These orders (1) suspended 
military commissions;6 (2) set a timetable and created procedures to 
shut down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility;7 (3) revoked all 
existing executive orders that were inconsistent with U.S. Geneva 
Convention treaty obligations concerning interrogation of detained 
individuals;8 and (4) created a task force to review U.S. detention 
policy options and U.S. interrogation techniques.9 
With the public backing its shutdown, prominent Republicans 
and Democrats alike calling for its closure, and the President’s ex-
ecutive orders creating the framework and timeline for implementa-
tion, the end of U.S. detentions at Guantanamo Bay seemed a fait 
accompli.  Yet, in 2011, Guantanamo Bay continues to operate and 
currently houses approximately 180 post-9/11 detainees who have 
  
 3. See Jon Cohen & Jennifer Agiesta, Public Supports Closing Guantanamo, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2009, at A6 (stating that fifty-three percent of Americans 
support finding alternative means “to deal with” the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay). 
    4. See Peter Baker, Obama Takes Oath, and Nation in Crisis Embraces the 
Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A1.  President Obama was sworn into of-
fice at 12:05 p.m. on January 20, 2009.  Id. 
 5. Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down 
Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1 (included in the sixteen retired 
admirals and generals witnessing President Obama sign these orders was Retired 
Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, former Dean and President of the University of 
New Hampshire School of Law). 
 6. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 7. Id. at 4898 (establishing a one-year timeline for the closure of Guantanamo 
Bay and calling for the immediate and individual review of all Guantanamo deten-
tions). 
 8. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4893–94 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 9. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
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not been tried for any crimes.10  This essay asks: Why, what hap-
pened? 
The world watched in January 2009 as Obama delivered his 
promise to close Guantanamo Bay.  However, by May 20, 2009, the 
U.S. Senate, controlled by Democrats, voted ninety to six to prohibit 
the use of federal funds “to transfer, release, or incarcerate detainees 
detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to or within the United 
States.”11  More recently, Congress, in approving the 2010 Defense 
Authorization Bill, banned the transfer of detainees held at Guanta-
namo Bay to the United States, even for criminal prosecution, and 
required that the Secretary of Defense sign off on the transfer of any 
detainee to a third country.12  Despite overwhelming support in the 
abstract for its closure, congressional pushback on implementation 
has stalled efforts to bring the U.S. practice of detaining individuals 
at Guantanamo Bay to an end.  In particular, the U.S. Senate balked 
at providing the President the necessary funds to begin phasing out 
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.13  What caused this discon-
nect between the newly-elected President and his Democrat-
controlled Congress?  What did the Obama Administration fail to 
calculate or understand about the legislature that resulted in the Pres-
ident failing to deliver on a key campaign promise? 
This article examines the Obama Administration’s failure to ex-
ecute its plans to close Guantanamo Bay and analyzes the lessons to 
be learned from this early misstep by the executive branch.  Part II of 
this article provides an overview of the three executive orders Ob-
ama signed and the actions and funding necessary to effectuate these 
orders.  This section also delineates the complex issues not ad-
dressed by the executive orders.  Part III identifies the different 
classes of individuals who were detained at Guantanamo Bay when 
the executive orders were signed and explains why each group ne-
  
 10. JTF Fact Sheets: Detainees, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO, 
http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil (last updated Jan. 27, 2011) (on file with au-
thor). 
 11. 155 CONG. REC. S5766 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (vote count for Senate 
Amendment 1133). 
 12. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 111-383, §§ 1032–34, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351–53 (2010). 
 13. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5766. 
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cessitates a different course of action with respect to its detention.  
Part IV provides a historical account of Congress’ successful efforts 
to thwart the President’s agenda by banning federal spending neces-
sary to effectuate the executive orders.  In the process, this section 
explores the politics that shaped the decision makers’ votes.  Part V 
argues that legislation would have been a more successful vehicle to 
effectuate the closure of Guantanamo Bay than the President’s unila-
teral issuance of executive orders to commence the process.  In con-
clusion, Part VI highlights the lessons to be learned by human rights 
activists from President Obama’s failed effort to deliver on a key 
campaign promise. 
II.  SWIFT EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTION, NO FUNDING, AND GAPING 
HOLES—STAGNATION 
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued his first three ex-
ecutive orders as the new President.14  This section provides a brief 
overview of each executive order and summarizes the cost estimates 
of implementing each executive order. 
Executive Order 13,491, “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” re-
voked all “executive directives, orders, and regulations” issued be-
tween September 11, 2001 and January 20, 2009 that contravene 
U.S. obligations to the Geneva Conventions.15  The executive order 
also articulated the Obama Administration’s standards and practices 
for interrogation of persons detained in armed conflict.16  Specifical-
ly, the executive order required that all interrogations, at a minimum, 
must comply with existing U.S. law and Common Article 3.17  In 
  
 14. Mazzetti & Glaberson, supra note 5, at A1. 
 15. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 16. Id. at 4894. 
 17. Id.; see The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, 
INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-
conventions.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  “The Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols are at the core of international humanitarian law, the body of 
international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its 
effects.”  Id.  Specifically, Convention I “protects wounded and sick soldiers on 
land during war.”  Id.  Convention II “protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
military personnel at sea during war.”  Id.  Convention III governs the treatment of 
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addition to circumscribing acceptable interrogation methods, the 
executive order required the closure of all CIA detention facilities 
and ordered unfettered access for the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to any individuals detained as a result of armed conflict.18  
Finally, the executive order created an interagency task force on in-
terrogation and transfer of detainees, which is chaired by the U.S. 
Attorney General.19 
Executive Order 13,492, “Review and Disposition of Individuals 
Detained At the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Deten-
tion Facilities,” required the immediate review of all 241 Guantana-
mo Bay detainees by an interagency review team led by the U.S. 
Attorney General.20  The executive order also established a one-year 
timeline for closing the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and 
suspended the use of military commissions.21 
Executive Order 13,493, “Review of Detention Policy Options,” 
established a “Special Task Force on Detainee Disposition,” co-
chaired by the U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Secretary of De-
fense.22  The task force was charged with conducting a comprehen-
sive review of the lawful options available to the U.S. Government 
in apprehending, detaining, putting on trial, transferring, and releas-
ing all individuals in U.S. custody due to armed conflicts and coun-
terterrorism operations.23  Finally, the task force was required to 
make policy recommendations on what lawful tactics are in the best 
  
“prisoners of war,” and Convention IV relates to the protection of civilians during 
a time of war or armed conflict “in occupied territory.”  Id.  All four of these con-
ventions contain the identical Article 3, which requires the humane treatment of all 
persons who are involved in non-international armed conflict and “establishes 
fundamental rules from which no derogation is permitted.”  Id.  It requires humane 
treatment for all persons in enemy hands and specifically prohibits murder, mutila-
tion, torture, cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment, the taking of hostages, 
and unfair trials.  Id. 
 18. 74 Fed. Reg. at 4894. 
 19. Id. at 4895. 
 20. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 23. Id. 
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interests of the United States with respect to its “national security 
and foreign policy interests.”24 
The costs of implementing these orders are unclear.  However, 
the President, in his 2010 and 2011 annual budget submissions to 
Congress, requested additional funding for the Department of Justice 
for “activities and expenses related to detainees currently or formerly 
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval 
base or elsewhere.”25  In addition, the President, in his April 9, 2009 
transmittal to Congress for the 2010 supplemental appropriations 
funding, requested thirty million dollars for the Department of Jus-
tice to support the creation of task forces to review the statuses of the 
approximately 240 detainees at Guantanamo Bay.26  Additionally, 
the President requested fifty million dollars for the Department of 
Defense for costs related to trying, transferring, and detaining indi-
viduals.27  Congress has categorically refused to fund any of these 
requests.28 
In addition to causing a standoff between the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches, these executive orders impacted the judiciary.  
Several of the detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings, which the Su-
  
 24. Id. 
 25. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APPENDIX, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 
739 (2010) (requesting an additional $72,771,000 for the Department of Justice’s 
salaries and expenses account); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APPENDIX, 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 719 (2009) (requesting an additional sixty million dollars 
for the Department of Justice’s salaries and expenses account) [hereinafter 2010 
BUDGET REQUEST]. 
  26. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FY 2009 
SUPPLEMENTAL (VARIOUS AGENCIES): APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST THAT WILL 
FUND OUR ONGOING MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, at 
71 (Apr. 9, 2009) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST]. 
 27. Id. at 28–29. 
 28. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 
3034, 3157 (2009) (refusing to fund the President’s request for the Department of 
Justice); Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 
1859, 1920 (2009) (refusing to fund any of the President’s supplemental funding 
requests to close Guantanamo Bay).  Currently, the funding for fiscal year 2011 is 
in limbo.  Congress has approved a continuing resolution that is set to expire on 
March 4, 2011.  See Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Exten-
sions Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-322, § 1, 124 Stat. 3518, 3518 (2010). 
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preme Court had recently ruled detainees were entitled to,29 were 
stayed until the task forces “ma[de] a broad assessment of detention 
policy.”30 
While the orders contemplated a timeline and bureaucratic struc-
ture for reviewing the detainees’ statuses and the legally permissive 
detention scenarios, there were key issues fundamental to ensuring 
an expedient closure of the naval base that were ignored.  For exam-
ple, where would the detainees in U.S. custody be housed one year 
later when the base was closed?  The Obama Administration knew 
that, at the very least, there was a subset of detainees that could not 
be repatriated to their home countries or a third country.  Further-
more, if some detainees were going to stand trial, where would they 
be housed during the pendency of their cases?  For those released, 
what responsibility did the United States have to make sure those 
individuals would not engage in terrorist activity?  For example, the 
day after Obama signed the executive orders, the New York Times, in 
a front page story, reported that Said Ali al-Shiri, a Guantanamo Bay 
detainee released by the Bush Administration, “had returned to ter-
rorist activity as the head of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch.”31 
III.  WHO REMAINS?  THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE DETAINEES 
LANGUISHING AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
When Obama signed the executive orders on January 22, 2009, 
of the 779 prisoners who spent time at Guantanamo Bay, approx-
imately 242 individuals remained there.32  Today, approximately 180 
  
 29.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the Consti-
tution’s guarantee of access to the writ of habeas corpus extends to detainees held 
at Guantanamo Bay); Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, 
and Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 887 (2010) (arguing that detai-
nees held at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan are entitled to access of the constitu-
tional guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus). 
 30. Jay Yagoda, Habeas Corpus: What the Closing of Guantanamo Bay Means 
for Future Challenges to Executive Detention From Abroad, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 347, 349 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 31. Robert F. Worth, Freed by U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2009, at A1. 
 32. See BENJAMIN WITTES & ZAAHIRA WYNE, THE CURRENT DETAINEE 
POPULATION OF GUANTÁNAMO: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 6 (2008). 
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individuals remain in custody at Guantanamo Bay.33  Deciding what 
to do with these detainees is complicated by the fact that there are 
individuals from thirty different countries who were, or currently 
are, detained at Guantanamo Bay.34  Five broad categories have been 
created “to help illuminate the role each detainee allegedly played” 
in terrorist activity: (1) twenty-seven members of al-Qaeda’s leader-
ship cadre; (2) ninety-nine lower-level al-Qaeda operatives; (3) nine 
members of the Taliban leadership cadre; (4) ninety-three foreign 
fighters; and (5) fourteen Taliban fighters and operatives.35  The task 
force led by the Department of Justice,36 in a report released on Jan-
uary 22, 2010, recommended dividing the Guantanamo Bay detai-
nees into three main categories: (1) forty-four who should be prose-
cuted in federal or military courts; (2) 126 who can be released either 
immediately or eventually; and (3) nearly fifty who must be detained 
without trial.37  Clearly, not all of the individuals are known or sus-
pected terrorists. 
For example, when the executive orders were signed, seventeen 
Chinese Uighurs were among the detainees.38  A federal judge had 
ordered the seventeen Chinese Uighurs to be released into the United 
States because they could not be returned to China because of legi-
timate fears of religious and ethnic persecution and torture.39  The 
  
 33. JTF Fact Sheets, supra note 10. 
 34.  WITTES & WYNE, supra note 32, at 7. 
 35. Id. at 2. 
 36. See Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 37. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 9–10 (2010); see also 
Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends About 50 Guantanamo Detainees to 
Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1. 
 38. Since September 11, 2001, twenty-two Uighurs have been held at Guanta-
namo Bay.  Warren Richey, Supreme Court Declines Case: U.S. Can Move Detai-
nees Without Notice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0322/Supreme-Court-declines-case-
US-can-move-detainees-without-notice.  Five of those Uighurs had been resettled 
prior to Obama signing the executive orders.  Besar Likmeta, From Albania, Freed 
Guantánamo Prisoner Watches Detainee Debate Unfold, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (May 23, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2009/0523/ 
p06s01-woeu.html. 
 39. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34, 42 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev’d, Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), va-
cated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (finding that the continued detention of the seven-
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U.S. government had cleared fifteen of the seventeen Uighur peti-
tioners for release prior to the filing of their habeas petitions, but all 
remained at Guantanamo Bay.40  In fact, the U.S. government de-
cided in August 2008 that the Uighurs were not enemy combatants 
and provided them less restrictive housing at Guantanamo Bay.41  
The judge held that the U.S. government’s continued detention of 
these seventeen Uighurs was unlawful and that the remedy should be 
admitting the Uighurs into the United States.42  While an appeals 
court overturned the judge’s order requiring the United States to ad-
mit these individuals,43 his finding that their detention was unlawful 
still stands.  To date, the United States has resettled all but five of the 
Uighurs in several countries, including Albania, Bermuda,44 Switzer-
land, and Palau.45  The five remaining Uighurs have refused offers of 
resettlement, and, on May 28, 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
  
teen Uighurs was unlawful and requiring the U.S. government to admit these indi-
viduals into the United States).  Under U.S. and international law, a country is 
prohibited from returning an individual to a country “where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 
see also 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Senate ratification of 
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
with list of reservations, understandings, and declarations). 
 40. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 35. 
 41. Id. (citing to a Joint Status Report and Notice of Status filed with the court). 
 42. Id. at 38–39, 42. 
  43. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 1028–29 (holding there is no legal basis to require the 
United States to admit individuals into the United States). 
  44. Dafna Linzer & Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Guantanamo Closing: White 
House Regroups After Missteps, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/.../obama-admin-officials-adm_n_299420.html.  
The U.S. decision to resettle four Uighurs in Bermuda caused a diplomatic rift 
between Britain and the United States.  Id.  “Bermuda [is] a self-governing British 
territory whose international relations are administered by Britain.”  Id.  The Unit-
ed States only provided Britain with two hours of notice that the Uighurs were 
going to be resettled in Bermuda.  Id. 
  45. Richey, supra note 38. 
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peals held that the Uighurs must either accept the offer of resettle-
ment to a third country or remain in detention at Guantanamo Bay.46  
Also, the U.S. government struggled with what to do with nine-
ty-four Yemenis who comprised more than one-third of the remain-
ing population.47  Although all of the Yemeni detainees were subject 
to Combatant Status Review Tribunals,48  only eight were released 
from Guantanamo Bay.49  This is in sharp contrast to the Pentagon’s 
decision to release 113 Saudi detainees to Saudi custody and repa-
triate 102 Afghani detainees to Afghanistan, where many of them 
were transferred to the Pul-e-Charkhi detention facility in Kabul.50  
Arguably, the continued U.S. detention of the Yemenis has more to 
do with the inability of the United States to broker a suitable ar-
rangement with the Yemeni government than “a judgment about the 
individual dangerousness posed by Yemeni versus Saudi and Afghan 
detainees . . . .”51  The Detainee Review Task Force report concluded 
that about thirty Yemeni detainees were eligible for immediate repa-
triation or resettlement to a third country, and about thirty others 
  
 46. Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
five remaining Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay must either accept U.S. offers to reset-
tle them in a third country or remain detained). 
 47. WITTES & WYNE, supra note 32, at 7. 
  48.  The Department of Defense ordered the creation of the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals in response to two Supreme Court rulings in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  Generally speaking, 
the Supreme Court held that detainees classified as enemy combatants by the U.S. 
government were entitled to impartial review of their status.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 
533; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.  The Supreme Court only held that U.S. citizens were 
entitled to review by a court.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.  The tribunals were created 
to provide review of enemy combatant statuses of non-U.S. citizens held at Guan-
tanamo Bay.  See Order from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to Sec’y of 
the Navy (July 7, 2004) (order establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals) 
(on file with author); see also Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Prisoners Getting Their 
Day, But Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at A1. 
  49. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF LAW INT’L 
JUSTICE CLINIC, THE ROLE OF THE YEMENI GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO 
CURRENT AND FORMER GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES FROM YEMEN 2 (May 30, 
2007),  http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/CCR_Fordham_submission.pdf. 
 50. WITTES & WYNE, supra note 32, at 7. 
 51. Id. at 7 & 30 n.27 (citing a series of newspaper articles discussing the U.S. 
foreign policy relationship with Yemen). 
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were placed in a category in which their release was predicated on 
conditions in Yemen stabilizing.52 
In addition to struggling to find third countries to resettle detai-
nees who were determined not to be a threat and are not enemy 
combatants, the Obama Administration is also struggling with what 
to do with the approximately fifty detainees that cannot be released 
and, as the Obama Administration is arguing, cannot be tried due to 
security reasons.53  Initially, there was some speculation that these 
detainees would be transferred to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which 
met strong objections from U.S. Senators Sam Brownback and Pat 
Roberts of Kansas.54 
Finally, although the Detainee Review Task Force recommended 
trying thirty-six detainees in federal court or military commissions,55 
and although the President issued a memorandum in December 2009 
to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to “acquire and 
activate” the Thomson Correctional Center in Thomson, Illinois as a 
U.S. penitentiary to accommodate the relocation of Guantanamo Bay 
detainees to the United States,56 many detainees have not been trans-
ferred.  While several detainees have been transferred to the United 
States for prosecution57 or have pleaded guilty in military commis-
  
 52. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 11; see also Finn, 
supra note 37, at A1. 
 53. See Finn, supra note 37, at A1; see also Devon Chaffee, The Cost of Indefi-
nitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued “Prolonged” Detention Is No Solution to 
Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 187, 189 (2009) (providing a compel-
ling argument on how allowing any detainees to languish in indefinite detention 
without a trial undermines the very national and foreign policy goals the Adminis-
tration seeks to achieve by closing the naval base). 
 54. 155 CONG. REC. S5600 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. Roberts); 
155 CONG. REC. S5602 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. Brownback). 
 55. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 9–10. 
 56. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec’y of Def. and the 
Att’y Gen. (Dec. 15, 2009) (Presidential Memorandum—Closure of Detention 
Facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-closure-
dentention-facilities-guantanamo-bay-naval-base (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
57.  For example, Ahmed Ghailani was sent to New York in June 2009 to face 
charges that he helped blow up U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.  See Devlin Bar-
rett, Gitmo Cases Referred to U.S. Prosecutors, CBS NEWS (Aug. 3, 2009), 
http://cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/03/national/main5208364.shtml. 
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sion proceedings,58 most of them remain at Guantanamo Bay.  Con-
gress recently thwarted any executive branch action to move detai-
nees from Guantanamo Bay to U.S. soil, even for the purpose of 
prosecution.59  The President continues to publicly decry Congress’ 
refusal to implement his executive orders; however, the Obama Ad-
ministration has done little to overcome these legislative hurdles.60 
IV.  NEVER UNDERESTIMATE THE PUBLIC’S FICKLENESS: CONGRESS 
PUSHES BACK AS PUBLIC SUPPORT PLUMMETS 
When President Obama was sworn into office in January 2009, a 
Gallup poll reported that fifty-three percent of Americans supported 
closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, up from thirty-three 
percent in 2007.61  Yet, by February 4, 2009, weeks after Obama 
signed the order setting a timeline for closing the naval base, a Gal-
lup poll found that the President received his second-highest nega-
tive rating of fifty percent for his order to close the Guantanamo Bay 
  
 58. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Deal Averts Trial in Disputed Guantanamo Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2010, at A12 (discussing plea agreement reached with Omar 
Khadr, who was fifteen when he was captured by the United States and held at 
Guantanamo Bay, and a side agreement reached between the U.S. and Canadian 
governments that allowed Khadr to serve out the remainder of his sentence in 
Canada); Charlie Savage, Guantanamo Detainee Pleads Guilty in Terrorism Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at A15 (summarizing detainee Ibrahim Ahmed Mah-
moud al-Qosi’s guilty plea to charges of conspiracy and providing material sup-
port to terrorism). 
 59. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (2010) (“Prohibition on the use 
of funds for the transfer or release of individuals detained at United States Naval 
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”).  President Obama signed the bill into law on 
January 7, 2011.  Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on 
H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523. 
 60. See Charlie Savage, Closing Guantanamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2010, at A13. 
 61. Kenneth Jost, Closing Guantánamo: Can Obama Close the Detention Camp 
Within One Year?, 19 CQ RESEARCHER 177, 183 (2009) (citing 2007 and 2009 
Gallup Poll results asking “Do you think the United States should close the prison 
at Guantanamo Bay?”). 
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detention facility.62  By June 3, 2009, public support for closing 
Guantanamo Bay dropped precipitously to thirty-two percent, while 
sixty-five percent of those polled opposed closing Guantanamo 
Bay.63  Even when the public supported closing Guantanamo Bay, it 
was never a priority in the public’s eye.  In a December 2008 Wash-
ington Post-ABC poll, closing Guantanamo Bay “fell last on an 
eight-item list of things [Obama] should do after taking of-
fice . . . .”64  So why then was it the first action Obama took as Pres-
ident? 
In part, the Obama Administration was deeply concerned about 
repairing the United States’ standing internationally.  During Presi-
dent Bush’s tenure, international opinion of the United States plum-
meted as the Bush Administration condoned the use of black sites, 
torture,65 and extra-judicial detention at Guantanamo Bay.66  “For-
mer British Prime Minister Tony Blair, former Secretary-General of 
the United Nations Kofi Annan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
and other heads of state have also unequivocally called for the clo-
sure of the Guantánamo facility.”67  A 2005 Pew report found that 
  
 62. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Approve of Most Obama Actions to Date, 
GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/114091/Americans-Approve-
Obama-Actions-Date.aspx. 
 63. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Oppose Closing Gitmo and Moving Prisoners to 
U.S., GALLUP (June 3, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/119393/americans-
oppose-closing-gitmo-moving-prisoners.aspx.  
 64. Cohen & Agiesta, supra note 3, at A6.  
 65. The Department of Justice advised the White House that CIA interrogation 
tactics used on al-Qaeda terrorist suspects were lawful because they did not consti-
tute physical torture.  The memo went on to argue that physical torture must be 
“equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as 
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”  See Memorandum 
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 1 (Aug. 1, 2002); see 
also Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. 
POST, June 9, 2004, at A3 (discussing the August 1, 2002 memo from the Depart-
ment of Justice to Alberto Gonzales).  
 66. Dakota S. Rudesill, Foreign Public Opinion and National Security, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 5223, 5234–35 (2010); see also Dicky Grigg, Guantanamo: It 
Is Not About Them—It Is About Us, 50 ADVOC. (TEXAS) 1, 3–4, 7 (2010) (discuss-
ing historical developments of dealing with Guantanamo Bay detainees). 
 67. Matthew Ivey, Note, A Framework for Closing Guantánamo Bay, 32 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 354 (2009). 
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China had a better image than the United States among eleven of the 
sixteen countries publics who were polled.68  In addition, the poll 
found that attitudes about America were focused on policies of the 
“Bush Administration, not on the American people themselves.”69 
Some experts have viewed Obama’s closing of the base as a ne-
cessary step to repair the U.S. image abroad.70  To that end, Obama 
took decisive steps as the new President to restore the international 
community’s support of the United States.  In addition to signing the 
executive orders to close Guantanamo Bay and reaffirm the U.S. 
Geneva treaty obligations,71 the President traveled to Europe in April 
2009.72  Significantly, Obama’s commitment to restore America’s 
image resonated with the American people.  An April 2009 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll found that seventy-nine 
percent of Americans surveyed felt that “Obama has had a ‘more 
positive effect’ on how people in other countries view the United 
States.”73 
While Obama and his Administration were able to make inroads 
in repairing the U.S. image abroad, they did little to court support 
from U.S. lawmakers.74  The Democrat-controlled Congress, which 
included a filibuster-proof Senate,75 was not consulted about the 
  
 68. Andrew F. Tully, Poll Finds Iraq War, Guantanamo Controversy Hurting 
Image Abroad, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (June 24, 2005), 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1059485.html.  
 69. Id. 
 70. See Cohen & Agiesta, supra note 3, at A6.  
 71. See Exec. Order 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009); Exec. 
Order 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27, 2009); Exec. Order 13,493, 74 
Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 72. John Vinocur, Analyzing Obama’s European Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/europe/14iht-politicus.html. 
 73. Bonnie Erbe, Obama’s Trip to Europe a Success, Public Opinion-Wise, CBS 
NEWS (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/08/usnews/whis 
pers/main4929167.shtml. 
  74.  Linzer & Kornblut, supra note 44 (reporting that senior White House advi-
sors acknowledged that the Administration failed to provide a plan on where to 
move the detainees and also mishandled Congress). 
 75. The 2008 elections increased the margins for Democrats to a filibuster-proof 
majority.  Franken Wins Senate Seat After Opponent Concedes, CBC NEWS (June 
30, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/06/30/franken-us-senate06300 
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Administration’s decision to close the naval base, nor did the Ad-
ministration provide any details on how the President’s orders would 
be implemented.76 
It was as if the Administration had completely failed to notice 
Congress’ fickle views about Guantanamo Bay.  In 2007, the debate 
over whether detention at Guantanamo Bay should continue to oper-
ate came to a head. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified be-
fore a House Committee that Guantanamo Bay should cease to oper-
ate.77  News reports depicted an internal disagreement among high-
level Bush Administration officials on how to handle Guantanamo 
Bay, fueling Congressional involvement.78  In April 2007, Senator 
Feinstein filed legislation to close Guantanamo Bay, which ultimate-
ly languished in the Senate Judiciary Committee after hearings on 
the bill.79  Trying to get her bill attached to must-pass legislation, 
Senator Feinstein filed the text of her legislation on July 11, 2007 as 
a floor amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008.80  Ultimately, Senator Feinstein withdrew her 
  
9.html.  The final Senate election results were fifty-eight Democrats, two Indepen-
dents, and forty Republicans.  See id. 
 76. Majority Leader Harry Reid in a Senate floor statement stated that “[t]he 
Democrats, under no circumstances, will move forward without a comprehensive, 
responsible plan from the President. . . . Once that plan is given to us, then we will 
have the opportunity to debate his plan.”  155 CONG. REC. S5589 (daily ed. May 
19, 2009) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid). 
 77. In March 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before the De-
fense Subcommittee on Appropriations that Guantanamo Bay should be closed 
and that there is a “taint” to how the process was undertaken.  See Fiscal Year 
2008 Defense Posture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Def. of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 110th Cong. 123 (2007) (statement of Secretary of Defense Ro-
bert Gates). 
 78. See Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Argued for 
Closing Guantánamo Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1.  
 79. S. 1249, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007) (requiring Guantanamo Bay to be closed 
within one year of enactment and all detainees to either be transferred to a U.S. 
military or civilian detention facility or released).  The U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings on the proposed legislation but never voted it out of 
committee.  At the end of the 110th Congress, the legislation died. 
  80.  153 CONG. REC. S9055 (daily ed. July 11, 2007) (offering S. Amend. 2125 
to H.R. 1585). 
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amendment because Senate procedural rules precluded her from 
forcing a vote on the amendment.81 
While Administration officials publicly acknowledged the need 
to shut down the naval base, the Senate was pushing back on the idea 
of moving detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United States.  On 
July 19, 2007, the Senate passed a Sense of the Senate resolution by 
a vote of ninety-four to three,82 stating that “detainees housed at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, including senior members of al Qaeda, 
should not be released into American society, nor should they be 
transferred stateside into facilities in American communities and 
neighborhoods.”83  Although the Sense of the Senate was not bind-
ing legislation,84 the vote publicly demonstrated an overwhelming 
opposition by a Democrat-controlled Senate to bringing Guantanamo 
Bay detainees to the United States.85  Interestingly, Senator Feins-
tein, who was actively pursuing legislation to close Guantanamo 
Bay, voted in support of this resolution.86 
Moreover, instead of engaging Senate leadership on strategy to 
implement his executive orders, the President simply requested a 
total of eighty million dollars for these orders, thirty million dollars 
  
  81.  See 153 CONG. REC. S9233–35 (daily ed. July 16, 2007) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein). 
 82. 153 CONG. REC. S9579 (daily ed. July 19, 2007) (rollcall vote no. 259).  
Senators not voting included Senators Brownback, Byrd, and Obama.  Id. 
 83. Id. at S9578.  The legislative clerk read the full text of the amendment spon-
sored by Senator McConnell.  Id. at S9577–78.  
 84. PAUL S. RUNDQUIST, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “SENSE OF” RESOLUTIONS 
AND PROVISIONS 1 (2003) (summarizing the legal authority of “sense of” resolu-
tions in the U.S. House and Senate). 
  85. In the 2006 midterm elections, the Democrats took control of both the House 
and Senate.  In the Senate, the Democrats took control by a slim margin of fifty-
one to forty-nine (fifty-one seats included Independent Senators Bernie Sanders 
(VT) and Joe Lieberman (CT) who caucused with the Democrats).  Election 2006: 
Final Senate Results, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/ 
public_content/politics/elections/election_2006/election_2006_final_senate 
_results (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  The 2008 elections increased the margins for 
Democrats to a filibuster-proof majority.  The final Senate elections results were 
fifty-eight Democrats, two Independents, and forty Republicans.  See FED. 
ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR UNITED STATES SENATE 
78, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/2008congres ults.pdf. 
 86. See 153 CONG. REC. S9579 (daily ed. July 19, 2007) (rollcall vote no. 259). 
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for the Department of Justice87 and fifty million dolars for the De-
partment of Defense, when he transmitted his request for supplemen-
tal funding to Congress.88  This request was buried in a ninety-nine 
page budget transmittal to Congress, the primary focus of which was 
funding for the war in Afghanistan.89  The House and Senate marked 
up their respective bills for supplemental funding for the war.  The 
House bill reported out the House Committee on Appropriations did 
not provide funding for the President’s request.90  In contrast, the 
Senate bill voted out of the Full Committee on Appropriations con-
tained the President’s request.91  The decision by the Senate to fund 
the President’s request was not prompted by any overtures from Se-
nate leadership.  Instead, the Subcommittee Chairs92 made the deci-
sion to include the funding in their portion of the supplemental.93 
When the Senate bill came to the floor for full consideration, 
public opinion for closing Guantanamo Bay had eroded, and Repub-
licans had finally found an issue that the public agreed with them 
  
 87. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST, supra note 26, at 71 (requesting 
thirty million dollars to execute the new task forces contemplated by the Presi-
dent’s executive orders as well as litigation and incarceration expenses). 
  88.  Id. at 29 (requesting fifty million dollars to fund transfers and further deten-
tion of individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay associated with the closing of the 
facility). 
  89.  See id. 
  90.  See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 2346, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(refusing to fund any of the President’s supplemental funding requests to close 
Guantanamo Bay). 
 91. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, S. 1054, 111th Cong., at 4–5, 
11 (2009).  This bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
and filed and adopted on the Senate floor as an amendment to substitute the passed 
House bill, H.R. 2346.  See 155 CONG. REC. S5589 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) 
(statement of Sen. Reid).   
 92. Senator Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) and Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI) 
chaired the Subcommittee on Appropriations for Defense and Commerce, Justice, 
Science, and Related Agencies in the 111th Congress.  U.S. GOV’T PRINTING 
OFFICE, OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 2009–2010, 111TH CONGRESS 
339–340 (2009). 
 93. See 155 CONG. REC. S5590 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. In-
ouye) (explaining how the bill was compiled and how each Subcommittee Chair 
was charged with reviewing the President’s request for agencies within their juris-
dictions and putting those recommendations into Appropriations Committee 
mark). 
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about.94  Republicans capitalized on the momentum of public sup-
port and began speaking on the Senate floor in strong opposition to 
closing Guantanamo Bay as the 2009 Supplemental Appropriations 
was being debated.95  Senator Mitch McConnell, the Republican 
leader, began his opening remarks about the supplemental by derid-
ing the President’s decision to put a timetable on closing Guantana-
mo Bay.96  He also encouraged members to support efforts to strip 
all funding for Guantanamo Bay out of the bill.97 
Republican Senators began coming to the Senate floor express-
ing concern about safety of their constituents if detainees were incar-
cerated in their states.98  Some Democrats pushed back, arguing that 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons has successfully detained convicted 
terrorists on U.S. soil.99  For example, Senator Feinstein argued that 
the public was safe even if terrorists are detained in the United 
States: 
Our system of justice is more than capable of prosecuting 
terrorists and housing detainees before, during, and after trial.  
We have the facilities to keep convicted terrorists behind bars 
indefinitely and keep them away from American citizens. 
. . . One example is the supermax facility in Florence, CO.  It 
is in not in a neighborhood or community. 
It is an isolated supermax facility.  It has 490 beds.  They 
are reserved for the worst of the worst.  This facility houses 
not only drug kingpins, serial murderers, and gang leaders, 
but also terrorists who have already been convicted of crimes 
in the United States. 
  
 94. See Trish Turner, Senate Dems Pull $80 Million in Gitmo Closure Funding, 
Oppose Transfer of Detainees to U.S., FOX NEWS (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/19/senate-dems-pull-million-gitmo-
closure-funding-oppose-transfer-detainees#ixzz1As6G2Gc. 
 95. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5589 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5653–54, S5658–59 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) 
(statements of Sen. Thune & Sen. Chambliss). 
 99. See, e.g., id. at S5660 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
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There have been no escapes, and it is as far, as I said, 
from America’s communities and neighborhoods, as are just 
about all the maximum and supermax facilities.100 
Yet, Republicans kept hammering away that the Administration 
had not submitted any plan to Congress on how it intended to carry 
out the executive orders, that the one-year timeline was artificial and 
unrealistic, and that the Administration had failed to consult with 
Congress.101  These arguments gained momentum, and the Demo-
crats, not wanting to be seen on the wrong side of public opinion, 
offered an amendment to the supplemental bill to strike all funding 
for closing Guantanamo Bay and to prohibit the transfer, release of, 
or incarceration in the United States of any of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees.102  The amendment passed ninety to six.103 
In addition to the amendment-stripping funding to close Guanta-
namo Bay, the Senate unanimously adopted104 a Sense of the Senate 
resolution recognizing the 2007 Sense of the Senate resolution, stat-
ing that “detainees housed at Guantanamo should not be released 
into American society, nor should they be transferred stateside into 
facilities in American communities and neighborhoods”105 and that 
the Secretary of Defense should consult with state and local authori-
ties before making any decisions about where to transfer detainees 
housed at Guantanamo Bay.106 
  
100. Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein).  Senator Durbin also made a floor statement 
arguing that the United States was equipped to try and house detainees from Guan-
tanamo Bay and that he supported the President’s request for funding.  See id. at 
S5654–57 (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
101. See 155 CONG. REC. S5589 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell); 155 CONG. REC. S5653–54, S5658–59 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) 
(statements of Sen. Thune & Sen. Chambliss). 
102. 155 CONG. REC. S5591 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (text of S. Amend. 1133). 
103. 155 CONG. REC. S5663 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (rollcall vote no. 196).  
Senators Durbin (D-IL), Harkin (D-IA), Leahy (D-VT), Levin (D-MI), Reed (D-
RI) and Whitehouse (D-RI) opposed.  Id. 
104. Id. at S5687 (rollcall vote no. 199).  The vote was ninety-four to zero, and 
five Senators were not present: Byrd (D-WV), Coburn (R-OK), Hatch (R-UT), 
Kennedy (D-MA), and Rockefeller (D-WV).  Id. 
105.  155 CONG. REC. S5602 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (quoting the text of S. 
Amend. 1140 from the 2007 resolution). 
106.  Id. 
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As Congress debated funding for the war supplemental, the Ob-
ama Administration was also furiously working to submit an 
amended budget request to Congress to fund the government for the 
2010 fiscal year.107  In his 2010 request, Obama asked Congress to 
provide sixty million dollars for the Department of Justice “for activ-
ities and expenses related to detainees currently or formerly detained 
by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval base or 
elsewhere.”108  In addition, he requested one hundred million dollars 
for the Department of Defense to fund costs associated with transfer-
ring or releasing detainees from Guantanamo Bay.109  Unlike the 
supplemental request, the Senate Subcommittee did not fund the 
President’s request for funding for Guantanamo Bay and explicitly 
stated that it would not.110  The House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee again refused to fund the President’s request for Guantanamo 
Bay funding.111  The President’s request for fiscal year 2011 funding 
for Guantanamo Bay met with a similar fate.112 
  
107. Pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the President is required 
to submit his annual budget request to Congress by the first Monday in February.  
See Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 201, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (current version at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 1105 (2006)).  Since President Obama was sworn into office on January 20, 
2009, his Administration was not able to submit a comprehensive budget request 
to Congress by the February deadline.  Instead, the Administration submitted a 
notice to Congress that a comprehensive request would be submitted in April 
2009.  Lori Montgomery & Ceci Connolly, Obama’s First Budget Seeks to Trim 
Deficit, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/21/AR20090221 00911.html (reporting on the timing 
of President Obama’s first budget submission to Congress).  The initial request 
was submitted to Congress on February 26, 2009.  See id. 
108. 2010 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 25, at 719. 
109. See id. at 269 (request for one hundred million dollars is imbedded within a 
larger request); see also PAT TOWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40567, 
DEFENSE: FY 2010 AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS 18 (2009) (explaining 
how the President’s request for funding related to Guantanamo Bay was in the Iraq 
Freedom Fund account). 
110. S. Rep. No. 111-34, at 27 (2009). 
111. H. Rep. No. 111-149, at 33 (2009) (refusing the President’s request for fund-
ing and directing the President to submit a comprehensive plan for closing Guan-
tanamo Bay and its estimates and requiring Congressional approval of the plan in 
order to receive funding). 
112. Currently, the funding for fiscal year 2011 is in limbo.  A continuing resolu-
tion is set to expire on March 4, 2011 allows for government agencies to operate 
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Most recently, Congress, in passing its annual National Defense 
Authorization Act, enacted three provisions that prohibited transfer-
ring Guantanamo Bay detainees.113  The first provision bans the use 
of any funding to transfer any detainee, even for prosecution, into 
the United States.114  The second provision forbids the transfer of 
detainees to another country unless the Secretary of Defense signs 
off on the safety of doing so.115  The third provision bans the pur-
chase of, or construction of, any facility in the United States for 
housing detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.116  Ultimately, although 
the President chided Congress for tying the executive branch’s 
hands, he did not attempt to assert his executive branch powers on 
the back end and bypass Congress’ mandate by issuing a signing 
statement arguing that the legislative ban on transfers was unconsti-
tutional when he signed the 2010 National Defense Authorization 
bill into law.117  
  
on fiscal year 2010 levels until Congress passes fiscal year 2011 appropriation 
bills.  Senate Subcommittees on Appropriations did not include funding for the 
President’s request in their respective committee mark-ups of their bills.  S. Rep. 
No. 111-229, at 28 (2010) (refusing the fund the President’s request of 
$72,771,000 for the Department of Justice for expenses related to prosecuting five 
suspected terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay).  The House Appropriations Sub-
committee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies as well as the 
House Appropriations Subcommittee did not mark up their bills for fiscal year 
2011. 
113. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 111-383, §§ 1032–34, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351–53 (2010) (signed by the Pres-
ident on Jan. 7, 2011). 
114. Id. § 1032. 
115. Id. § 1033. 
116. Id. § 1034. 
117. Charlie Savage, New Measure to Hinder Closing of Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A11 (discussing President Obama’s decision not to issue a 
signing statement claiming that the 2010 National Defense Authorization Bill is 
unconstitutional and that he would bypass the bill’s provisions); Charlie Savage, 
Obama May Bypass Guantánamo Rules, Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, at 
A15 (summarizing the debate among Presidential aides about whether Obama 
should issue a signing statement to bypass restrictions in the 2010 Defense Autho-
rization Bill when he signs the bill into law).  
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V.  HOW EFFECTIVE ARE EXECUTIVE ORDERS?  THE ADVANTAGE OF 
MAKING CONGRESS THE ARCHITECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL POLICY 
CHANGE  
So as Congress stymied one of the President’s key campaign 
promises, the same Congress delivered on some other arguably more 
controversial issues, such as passing a huge spending bill to 
jumpstart the fledgling economy,118 overhauling health care,119 re-
pealing the Department of Defense’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” poli-
cy,120 and extending tax cuts for the middle class and unemployment 
benefits for the jobless.121  All of these Presidential victories were 
also hard-fought victories for Democrats in Congress.  The key dif-
ference seems to lie in the President’s execution of his campaign 
promises.  When promises were delivered as legislation and not im-
plemented by fiat, President Obama emerged triumphant. 
This section provides a brief overview of executive orders, when 
they are typically used, and why.  This section concludes by arguing 
that President Obama would have been more successful in getting 
closer to closing Guantanamo Bay if he had enlisted Congress to 
draft and pass legislation.  His greatest misstep was assuming Con-
gress would rubberstamp his budget request without providing Con-
gress a comprehensive plan and consulting with the members at the 
outset. 
  
118. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
119. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
120. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515 (2010) (bill that repealed the Department of Defense’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy towards gays serving in the military).  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was a 
1993 legislative compromise that allowed gays to continue to serve in the military 
if they agreed to remain silent about their sexual orientation and celibate while in 
the military.  See US: Obama Repeals “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/21/us-congress-
repeals-don-t-ask-don-t-tell.  While the policy was intended to protect gays serving 
in the military, the number of gays discharged from the military due to this policy 
has been on the rise.  Id.  
121.  Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-205, 
124 Stat. 2236 (2010); Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and 
Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010). 
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Executive orders are issued to instruct an executive branch agen-
cy on how to carry out legislation.122  Typically, executive orders 
“make ‘legally binding pronouncements’ in the fields of authority 
generally conceded to the President.”123  One example is security 
classifications.124  Practically speaking, executive orders are attrac-
tive because they are not subject to congressional debate and vote.  
They can be issued with ease to respond to national emergencies like 
terrorism or natural disasters when immediate action is necessary.125  
Also, they can be used to make broad policy pronouncements.126  
For President Obama, he was able to mandate the closure of Guanta-
namo Bay within days of taking office, thereby demonstrating his 
willingness to effectuate change swiftly and confidently.  These or-
ders signaled to the democratic base that Obama was committed to 
delivering on key campaign promises and was not afraid of using his 
inherent power as the President to make things happen.127 
Presidents have also “used executive orders to make law in areas 
in which Congress has been silent” and “to carry out orders of the 
Supreme Court.”128  These uses by the President have often spurred 
debate about the constitutional separation and limitations of the three 
branches of government.129 
In certain instances, the judiciary will reign in excessive execu-
tive branch actions.  During President Truman’s term, the Supreme 
Court, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,130 for the first 
  
122. John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmer-
ings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 344 (2010) (analyz-
ing the history, use, authority, and limitations of executive orders). 
123. Id. at 346 (quoting PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE 
USE & ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 21 (2002)). 
124. Id. 
125. See id. at 396. 
126. Id. at 400 (discussing President Clinton’s liberal use of executive orders to 
advance his political objectives and overcome pushback from the Republican-
controlled Congress). 
127. See id. at 405 (arguing that President Obama’s early executive orders were 
typical for a successor President from an opposing party). 
128.  Duncan, Jr., supra note 122, at 345. 
129.  See id.  The President’s power to issue executive orders is derived from Ar-
ticle II, Section 3 of the Constitution, inherent powers of the President, and, in 
some cases, statute.  See generally id. at 366–372. 
130. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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time ever, overturned an executive order in its entirety.131  President 
Truman issued an executive order to take possession of the nation’s 
steel mills during the Korean War because the unions had threatened 
to go on strike.132  Justice Black, writing for the majority, held that 
there was no authorization, not constitutionally or statutorily, for 
President Truman to issue his order, despite the fact that the country 
was at war.133 
The other check on excessive executive branch power is Con-
gress.  Congress can rewrite laws that override executive orders, it 
can withhold funding to the agency charged with carrying out the 
order, and it can challenge the order in court.134  In the case of Guan-
tanamo Bay, while there was no litigation challenging the Presi-
dent’s authority to issue the orders, Congress refused to fund the 
agencies charged with implementing the orders, thereby rendering 
the orders obsolete. 
President Obama, a constitutional scholar and a prior legislator 
equipped with knowledge about the legislative process,135 still opted 
to use his executive branch authority to initiate closing Guantanamo 
Bay instead of legislating it.  Yet, for his domestic priorities like the 
economy and healthcare, Obama turned to Congress to draft the ar-
chitecture for his policy reforms.  When he chose to enlist the aid of 
the legislative branch, he was successful.  By the end of 2010, Ob-
ama had delivered on many key campaign promises and in some 
cases had done so in the lame duck session of Congress. 
Overall, there are several advantages of using legislation to mo-
bilize systemic change.  First, by having Congress draft legislation, 
the members are invested in its outcome.  Second, by allowing Con-
gress to author the details, often times the parochial concerns of 
members can be accommodated with little contention.  Finally, if 
Congress debates the merits of a plan and votes to support it, the 
members are more likely to fund its implementation. 
  
131. Id. at 587. 
132. Id. at 582–83.  
133. Id. at 587. 
134. Duncan, Jr., supra note 122, at 393. 
135. See Janny Scott, In Illinois, Obama Proved Pragmatic and Shrewd, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/us/politics/ 
30obama.html (discussing the President’s professional background). 
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Congress had already begun to debate and discuss closing Guan-
tanamo Bay.136  Yet, instead of going to the leaders in the Senate and 
House who had introduced legislation or publicly spoke on their 
support for closing the detention facility, Obama acted unilaterally. 
In the U.S. Senate, Obama had some strong potential advocates.  
Since the Senate is a more deliberative body that often requires bi-
partisan support for legislation to pass, Obama needs bipartisan sup-
port for his agenda.  Senator Feinstein (D-CA), a senior senator with 
a reputation for working with Republicans to pass legislation and 
Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, would have been a po-
werful ally.137  In addition, Senator Durbin (D-IL), the President’s 
colleague from Illinois and chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Human Rights, could have been mobilized to secure caucus-
wide support in his role as majority whip had Obama secured a 
commitment from leadership that this was a congressional priority.  
Furthermore, Lindsey Graham (R-SC), a Republican Senator and a 
former Navy JAG Officer, was an outspoken supporter of closing 
Guantanamo Bay.138  He could have been used strategically to con-
vince Republican members to support legislation phasing out the use 
of the detention facility. 
In the House, Speaker Nancy Pelosi had a fierce reputation for 
whipping Democrats into line and delivering key votes on democrat-
ic priorities.139  She exhibited an extraordinary talent for herding a 
fractured democratic caucus, many who were from conservative 
states, to secure the necessary votes needed to pass contentious legis-
lation in the House of Representatives.140  But Obama sent his re-
quests through the House Appropriations Committee in the form of 
  
136. See, e.g., supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
137. See Senator Dianne Feinstein, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, 
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/events/2009/11/inf/FeinsteinSenatorDiann
e.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (discussing Sen. Feinstein’s professional ac-
complishments). 
138. See Robert Draper, Lindsey Graham, This Year’s Maverick, N.Y. TIMES, July 
1, 2010, at MM22. 
139. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jeff Zeleny & Carl Hulse, President Obama, 
Speaker Pelosi Used Resolve, Arm-Twisting to Get to Sunday’s Health-Care Vote, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/ 
2010/03/president_obama_speaker_pelosi_1.html. 
140. See id. 
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budget requests instead of through the leader’s office, choosing to 
leave its fate in the hands of the maverick Representative David 
Obey (D-WI).  As appropriations chair, Representative Obey was 
known for acting out and bucking the party line when he deemed 
appropriate.141  He decided to ignore the President’s request, and the 
House appropriations bills never included any funding for the Presi-
dent to begin implementing his executive orders.  The House Appro-
priations Committee would have been in a much different posture if 
the House had first passed legislation authorizing the closure of 
Guantanamo Bay, contemplated a comprehensive plan, and been 
provided a detailed assessment of the estimated costs.  
Overall, instead of using a Democrat-controlled Congress to 
enact President Obama’s priorities through legislation, the Adminis-
tration’s unilateral assertion of executive power has resulted in polit-
ical inertia. 
VI.  THE TAKE AWAY: WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
OBAMA’S DEBACLE? 
The final part of this essay analyzes the lessons that can be 
learned from the Obama Administration’s debacle in attempting to 
close Guantanamo Bay.  In part, this section attempts to provide in-
sight to human rights advocates as well as other public policy advo-
cates on pitfalls to avoid in attempting to advance substantial policy 
changes and on what works in promoting change. 
First, there is a difference between the public supporting an idea 
and the public viewing the idea as a priority.  The polls indicated that 
when Obama initially took office, the majority of Americans sup-
ported closing Guantanamo Bay.142  Yet, another poll taken around 
the same time found that closing Guantanamo Bay was not a priority 
  
141. See David Libit, The Insider, MILWAUKEE MAG. (Feb. 1, 2008), 
http://www.milwaukeemagazine.com/currentissue/full_feature_story.asp?newmess
ageid=18353. 
142. Fifty-three percent of Americans supported closing Guantanamo Bay in Jan-
uary 2009.  Jost, supra note 61, at 183 (citing 2007 and 2009 Gallup Poll results 
asking “Do you think the United States should close the prison at Guantanamo 
Bay?”). 
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of the American people.143  The difference between these two polls 
is telling.  A person who views an idea as a priority issue has a 
greater stake in its outcome than a person who simply supports an 
idea or issue in the abstract.  While Obama had most likely assessed 
general public support of closing Guantanamo Bay by reviewing 
polling data, it appears that he paid less attention to whether the pub-
lic viewed it as a priority.  In part, Obama was most concerned about 
placating his base—the progressive left—who clearly and loudly 
indicated that closing Guantanamo Bay was important to them.  In 
addition, when Obama took office, the economy was in a tailspin,144 
and Americans were losing their jobs and fearing for their futures.145  
Arguably, Americans became more concerned about their own live-
lihoods and less concerned about the morality of detaining suspected 
terrorists.  In general, public support largely depends on how much 
the issue affects day-to-day lives.  Closing Guantanamo Bay was an 
abstract proposition; the economy and jobs were on the forefront of 
most American’s minds, and certainly the voters, when they went to 
the polls in November 2010 for midterm elections.146  The lesson 
learned here is that public support may be ephemeral—the best indi-
cator of entrenched support is self-interest, not international percep-
tions or morality. 
Second, an advocate should never underestimate the power of 
“Not In My Backyard” syndrome, often referred to as NIMBY.147  
  
143. In a Washington Post-ABC poll taken in December 2008, closing Guanta-
namo Bay was the last priority on a list of eight items that President Obama should 
do when taking office.  Cohen & Agiesta, supra note 3, at A6.  In fact, only eigh-
teen percent of those polled thought that closing the base was something Obama 
should do immediately.  Id. 
144. See Daniel Trotta, Obama Takes Office with World Economy in Crisis, 
REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4B70ME 
20090120?page Number=1.  
145. The week Obama took office unemployment claims hit a twenty-six year 
high, while home building starts fell to their lowest rate since 1959.  Jacki Lyden, 
Obama Takes Office Under Economic Cloud, NPR (Jan. 24, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99844560. 
146. See Reed Abelson, Poll: The Economy Trumps Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2010, http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/poll-the-
economy-trumps-health-care/?ref=healthcarereform. 
147. NIMBY, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/nimby (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
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Many people support strict criminal penalties for repeat or violent 
offenders, yet most communities shun building a prison next to their 
schools or hospitals.  Republicans capitalized on the NIMBY phe-
nomenon.  Republican Senators marched to the Senate floor decry-
ing Obama’s efforts to close Guantanamo Bay and argued that his 
efforts put their constituents’ safety at grave risk.148  They asked, 
where were remaining detainees going to be held?  Fear began to 
surface, and the public began to equate the closing of Guantanamo 
Bay with a terrorist moving into their neighborhood.  Never mind 
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has successfully held hundreds of 
convicted terrorists in remote, secure facilities in the United States, 
and none of these terrorists have escaped federal custody.149  The 
public was apoplectic.  No one wanted a terrorist living next door.  
The take-away point here is that the public may support an idea in 
the abstract, but if the solution dramatically alters someone’s life or 
neighborhood, the public is not usually willing to put idealism over 
its own backyard. 
Finally, this example highlights that issuing unilateral executive 
orders, and then asking Congress to fund those decisions, is much 
less effective than having Congress help create the framework for 
significant policy changes.  Congress is an independent branch of 
government regardless of whether the members’ party affiliation is 
the same as the President’s.  Since members of the House are elected 
every two years, they are particularly sensitive to the idiosyncratic 
whims of the constituents in their district.  For the President, it is 
often easier to support sweeping change on a policy level.  Although 
Senators are elected every six years, they are still bound to protect 
parochial concerns of their constituents.  Congress members go 
home every weekend to their respective districts and must explain 
their votes, decisions, and legislative priorities to the voters often at 
supermarkets, churches, and bingo halls. 
Often times, when members of Congress can control the message 
or create the narrative addressing the problem, they can show their 
  
148. See 155 CONG. REC. S5589 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell); 155 CONG. REC. S5653–54, S5658–59 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) 
(statements of Sen. Thune & Sen. Chambliss). 
149. See 155 CONG. REC. 5654–57 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Durbin). 
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constituents how their votes are in line with constituent priorities and 
concerns.  In contrast, when Congress is told to do what the Presi-
dent wants and fund a controversial proposal, the members are in 
less control of the message and less invested in the outcome. 
Furthermore, in the Senate, particularly in the Appropriations 
Committee, members work across the aisle.  Until recently, appro-
priators tended to vote as a block regardless of party affiliation, pro-
tecting their funding prerogatives and funding for their home dis-
tricts.  For example, the Senate Supplemental Appropriations mark 
included funding to close Guantanamo Bay.  Yet, during the Senate 
floor debate about closing Guantanamo Bay, ultimately it was the 
Chair of the Appropriations Committee who filed the amendment on 
the floor to strip funding out of the supplemental bill.150  The Chair’s 
action provided cover to other appropriators to vote in support of 
stripping the funding.  Since the Chair authored the amendment, 
there was no longer any obligation to support the appropriations bill 
as it was marked up out of committee.  Generally, appropriators vote 
together to protect funding when other senators attempt to strip fund-
ing out of appropriations bills or move funds from one account to 
fund a priority not accommodated by the appropriators.  Since these 
members value collegiality, compromise, and consultation, it is no 
surprise that Obama’s efforts to fund Guantanamo Bay closure was 
thwarted.  If the Senate had been charged with crafting legislation, 
the members would have been committed to making sure they had 
the votes to pass it. 
Overall, if the Obama Administration wants to close Guantana-
mo Bay, it must get Congress to lead the charge.  This is going to be 
extremely difficult now with a Republican House of Representatives 
and Democrat Senate that holds the majority by the narrowest of 
margins.  At this point, it seems as if the Administration has aban-
doned its campaign to close Guantanamo Bay.  The only silver lining 
is that the Administration hopefully has learned important lessons on 
what works and what is a non-starter and can use this knowledge 




150. 155 CONG. REC. S5591 (daily ed. May 19, 2009) (text of S. Amend. 1133). 
